
















This paper presents a basic framework that can be used to assess whether mandatory 
structural separation is desirable in a given market. This framework is illustrated in the 
context of the market for fixed telecommunications. It can, in principle, also be applied to 
other industries, such as electricity, post, railways, and financial services (e.g. clearing 
and settlement). The key question that underlies the case for structural separation is the 
following: is local access a persistent bottleneck? Only if the answer is yes, does it make 
sense to compare the costs and benefits of structural separation. 
 
(Extended abstract on next page)
                                                   
* TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center) and CentER for Economic Research, Tilburg 
University, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands; also affiliated with the ENCORE 
Fellows Network; e-mail: pdebijl@uvt.nl. This paper is based on a presentation prepared for 
the conference “Structural Separation and Access Pricing: A New Synthesis” organized by 
OECD, Ministry of Economic Affairs and ENCORE, on 21 November 2003 in Amsterdam. 
Financial support from the conference organizers is gratefully acknowledged. I wish to thank 
Eric van Damme, Pierre Larouche, and the conference participants for helpful comments and 
discussion. All errors are my own. 
   2
Extende abstract 
Given the growing importance of broadband connections, the  demands on local  loop 
unbudling (LLU) are increasing. At the same time, it seems fair to say that LLU is still in 
its infancy, given that it can potentially be used to target mass segments of markets for 
fixed telephony. To make LLU a success, regulatory frameworks have been set up to 
ensure  that  entrants  can  get  access  to  key  inputs  from  incumbents.  However, 
incumbents do not have strong incentives to act in a cooperative manner, as it would 
result in more intense competition. In the light of these incentive problems, questions 
have been raised about the effectiveness  of regulation  aiming  at  the  development of 
LLU-based entry. 
 
It  is  widely  accepted  that  behavioral  regulation, such  as  regulating  wholesale  access 
prices, has its limitations. Therefore, it has been suggested that it might be better to 
directly change incumbents’ incentives, rather than trying to control their behavior. One 
way to do this is to structurally separate, on a mandatory basis, the regulated firm into 
monopoly  part  and  a  competitive  part  (’structural  separation’).  Accordingly,  a  central 
question is whether the effectiveness of LLU can be increased in a more drastic way, 
compared to fine-tuning of current regulatory interventions. 
 
In this paper, I try to provide a perspective on structural separation that is broader than 
the viewpoint sometimes presented in policy discussions. In particular, I will not weigh the 
relative costs and benefits of structural separation compared to behavioral regulation. 
Instead,  this  paper  presents  a  basic framework  that  can  be used  to  assess  whether 
mandatory  structural  separation  is  desirable  in  a  given  market.  This  framework  is 
illustrated in the context of the market for fixed telecommunications. It can, in principle, 
also  be  applied  to  other  industries,  such  as  electricity,  post,  railways,  and  financial 
services  (e.g.  clearing  and  settlement).  The  key  question  that  underlies  the  case  for 
structural separation is the following: is local access a persistent bottleneck? Only if the 
answer  is  yes,  does  it  make  sense  to  compare  the  costs  and  benefits  of  structural 
separation. 
 
The framework presented in this paper is used to discuss static and dynamic efficiency in 
telecommunications markets. Particular attention is paid to firms’ incentives to invest and 
innovate, depending on the regulatory regime. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Telecommunications markets have known great turmoil during the last decade.
1 The ICT 
bubble of the late 1990s, to a certain extent caused by unrealistic views about the new 
economy, resulted in misguided strategies and investments. Internet startups blossomed, 
but many of them failed to deliver on their promises. High-profile growth strategies, for 
instance based on takeovers abroad, were pursued in the telecommunications industry, 
but  the  claimed  gains  did  not  materialize.  In  several  European  countries,  mobile 
operators bid huge amounts in spectrum auctions for the third generation (3G) of mobile 
telephony UMTS. Overly optimistic speculations about growth in data communication led 
to huge investments in long-distance networks (roughly ¼ELOOLRQZRUOGZLGH$IWHUWKH
burst  of  the  bubble,  survival  was  the  name  of  the  game.  Telecoms  firms  started 
restructuring their financial structure, organization and management. At present, most 
firms in the telecommunications industry seem to be in relatively good shape, ready to 
return their focus to strategies based on innovation and investment. 
 
In  the  market  for  fixed  telecommunications,  broadband  internet  access  is  picking  up 
speed. Fixed telecoms operators upgrade their copper lines to digital subscriber lines 
(DSL),  allowing  for  high-speed  data  transfers.  In  some  areas,  WiFi  ’hotspots’  are 
connected to create a regional local access network.
2 The second generation (2G) of 
mobile telephony is very successful, and several operators’ recent marketing efforts have 
been  directed  towards  service  packages  that  include multimedia  data  communication 
based on packet-switched technology.
3 An example is NTT DoCoMo’s i-mode, marketed 
and sold in the Netherlands by KPN. The number of mobile subscribers in the European 
Union  increased  from  69  million  in  1998  to  306  million  in  2003,  while  the  average 
penetration  rate  in  the  EU  increased  from  18%  in  1998  to  81%  in  2003.
4  For  an 
increasing number of consumers, a mobile  telephone is an  adequate substitute for a 
fixed connection. Innovative applications of 2G mobile telephony are being implemented, 
for instance based on data communication combined with the Global Position System 
(GPS)  in  transportation  and  logistics.  Mobile  operators  are  warming  up  for  the 
introduction of third generation (3G). This technology, known as UMTS in Europe, may 
lead to applications beyond mobile telephony and mobile broadband access, just as the 
                                                   
1 See, for instance, “Beyond the bubble: A survey of telecoms”, The Economist, 11 October 
2003. 
2  An  example  of  an  apparently  successful  experiment  is  discussed  in  “Wifi  evolueert  in 
Leiden”, Computable, 2003, p. 26-27. 
3 Data is split into small packets that are separately transmitted, as is also the case for the 
Internet. 
4 European Commission (2003).   4
short  message  service  (SMS)  was  an  unexpected  hit  for  2G  mobile  telephony.  In 
particular, since UMTS allows for high-speed data communication, it can also be used as 
an alternative for a fixed Internet connection.
5 
 
Perhaps the major promise of the 1990s was the rollout of local access networks.
6 In 
fact,  underlying  the  liberalization  of  telecommunications  markets  was  the  belief  that 
technological progress would end the natural-monopoly nature of the industry. Given the 
high expectations, however, local network rollout has been disappointing, and at present, 
there is still only little competition in the ’local loop’. So far, network rollout has been 
narrowly  targeted. While  operators found  it  worthwhile  to  connect  offices in  business 
districts  and  metropolitan  areas,  residential  customers  have  hardly  been  exposed  to 
entrants with their own networks. Residential callers did, however, benefit from entry by 
firms  without  their  own  networks,  purchasing  capacity  from  incumbent  operators  and 
reselling it to end-users in  order to offer voice telephony services (known as  ’Carrier 
Select’ services). 
 
Similar to facilities-based entry (i.e., based on network rollout), entry based on ’local loop 
unbundling’  (LLU)  has  not  demonstrated  the  growth  that  was  initially  expected.
7 
8  At 
present, it seems most promising as a means for entrants to offer broadband Internet 
access  based  on  DSL  technology.  Given  the  growing  importance  of  broadband 
connections, the demands on LLU are increasing. At the same time, it seems fair to say 
that  LLU  is  still  in  its  infancy,  given  that  it  can  potentially  be  used  to  target  mass 
segments of markets for fixed telephony. 
 
To make LLU a success, regulatory frameworks have been set up to ensure that entrants 
can get access to key inputs from incumbents. However, incumbents do not have strong 
incentives to act in a cooperative manner, as it would result in more intense competition. 
                                                   
5  UMTS  modems  are  expected  to  be  twice  as  fast  as  GPRS,  approaching  the  speed  of 
current DSL-based technologies. 
6  Local  access  networks,  also  known  as  customer  access  networks,  connect  end-users’ 
devices to local switches. The transmission medium typically consists of wire (e.g. copper 
wire or optical fibre) or radio spectrum. 
7 Unbundling of the incumbent’s local acess network allows entrants to lease the incumbent’s 
local lines in order to get access to end-users. 
8  It  is  important  to  note  that  if  the  success  of  LLU  has  been  limited,  this  is  largely  in 
comparison  to  policy  makers’  initial  expectations.  In  general,  there  exists  no  objective 
benchmark to assess the timeliness and speed of adoption of new technologies. Instead of 
regulatory ineffectiveness, the slow pick-up of LLU might just as well be due to well-informed 
business decisions.   5
In  the  light  of  these  incentive  problems,  questions  have  been  raised  about  the 
effectiveness of regulation aiming at the development of LLU-based entry.
9 
 
It  is  widely  accepted  that  behavioral  regulation, such  as  regulating  wholesale  access 
prices,  has  its  limitations.
10  For  instance,  regulators  are  not  perfectly  informed  about 
incumbents’ cost levels, information which is needed to select optimal regulated prices. 
Also,  designing  regulation  is  a  complex  matter,  requiring  substantial  time  and  effort 
without  guaranteeing  that  regulatory  interventions  are  optimal.  Therefore,  it  has  been 
suggested that it might be better to directly change incumbents’ incentives, rather than 
trying to control their behavior (see e.g. OECD, 2002, for an overview). One way to do 
this is to structurally separate, on a mandatory basis, the regulated firm into monopoly 
part and a competitive part (’structural separation’). Accordingly, given the limitations of 
behavioral  regulation,  a  central  question  is  whether  the  effectiveness  of  LLU  can  be 
increased  in  a  more  drastic  way,  compared  to  fine-tuning  of  current  regulatory 
interventions. 
 
In this paper, I try to provide a perspective on structural separation that is broader than 
the viewpoint sometimes presented in policy discussions. In particular, I will not weigh the 
relative costs and benefits of structural separation compared to behavioral regulation. 
Instead, I will argue that before deciding on the introduction of structural separation, a 
crucial question needs to be addressed first: is local access a persistent bottleneck?  
 
A  closely  related  paper  is  Crandall  and  Sidak  (2002),  who  discuss  several  cases  of 
structural separation in the US. They argue that (mandatory) structural separation leads 
to substantial costs in terms of forgone coordination benefits and economies of scope.  In 
their view, based on empirical observation in the US, the observed failures of entrants 
flow  from  defects  in  their  own  strategies,  rather  than  from  anticompetitive  behavior. 
Furthermore,  they  argue  that  structural  separation  is  harmful  for  consumers  and 
investments. Also related is Cave (2003), discussing structural separation in the context 
of postal markets and presenting a somewhat different decision tree that assesses the 
case for structural separation. The literature on access and investment incentives is also 
closely related to this paper, see, for instance, Cave and Vogelsang (2002) and Valletti 
(2002). 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides the conceptual starting points 
of the paper. First, it presents a simple definition of structural separation that is useful for 
                                                   
9 See, for instance, the publications by OECD in the list of references. 
10 See, for instance, Laffont and Tirole (2000).   6
the purposes of this paper. Next, it briefly discusses the costs and benefits of structural 
separation. Third, on a stylized level it presents different modes of entry and competition, 
and discusses their welfare implications both in the short and the long run. Based on 
these starting points, Section 3 provides a rudimentary framework to assess whether 
structural separation is an option (from a welfare point-of-view). Section 4 concludes the 
paper with a brief summary and a personal outlook on the telecommunications industry. 
 
  
2. Structural separation: the broader picture 
 
2.1 What is structural separation? 
 
There are many defitions of structural separation, ranging from setting up ’Chinese walls’ 
between monopoly  parts  and competitive  parts  (leading  to  accounting  separation),  to 
’physically’ breaking up a company into parts without ties between them (leading to full 
ownership separation). OECD (2003) contains an extensive overview of different modes 
of separation.  
 
For  the  purposes  of  this  paper,  a  rather  rudimentary,  generic  notion  of  structural 
separation will be used. According to this definition, the incumbent is split into:
11 
 
·  a company owning the local access network, providing wholesale access (’LoopCo’); 
·  the  rest  of  the  company,  owning  the  long-distance  backbone  and  providing  retail 
services (’NetCo’). 
 
The central idea of this stylized definition is that the incumbent’s retail operations are put 
in a position similar to that of LLU-based entrants. Accordingly, NetCo leases local lines 
from LoopCo, just like LLU-based entrants. Based on this new constellation, one can 
discuss the costs and benefits of separation. 
 
Structural separation has several potential or claimed benefits and costs. Crandall and 
Sidak  (2002)  and  OECD  (2003)  contain  extensive  discussions  on  this  topic.  In  this 
subsection, I will give a brief overview, which is not meant to be exhaustive or complete. 
 
The main benefit, which was already mentioned in the Introduction, is non-discriminatory 
access for all operators without local networks. Separation eliminates both the ability and 
                                                   
11  This  definition  is  also  discussed  in  “Beyond  the  bubble:  A  survey  of  telecoms”,  The 
Economist, 11 October 2003.   7
the incentives to restrict competition in the downstream market. In particular, it eliminates 
the  incumbent’s  incentives  and  possibilities,  whether  legal,  economic  or  technical,  to 
raise the costs of its rival firms by reducing quality or increasing the cost of access. This 
increases the intensity of competition, and may ultimately lead to lower prices for end-
users.  On a more general level, the scope for anticompetitive practices, for instance on 
the market for broadband Internet access, may be reduced.
12 
 
Structural  separation  helps  to  prevent  cross-subsidization  and  makes  reliable  cost 
information  about  the  incumbent’s  non-competitive  activities  more  readily  available.  
Ultimately,  the  idea  is  that  regulation  becomes  much  simpler  and  effective,  and  less 
costly.  Not  only  are  firms  that  are  not  vertically  integrated  easier  to  monitor, 
anticompetitive behavior is much less likely to occur. 
 
There  are  also  many  potential  and  claimed  costs  and  disadvantages  to  structural 
separation. In itself it is a very drastic and costly intervention, while there is no guarantee 
that it will lead to the desired outcome. In particular, it is uncertain if regulation will really 
become more effective and simple. The incumbent faces a substantial cost to reorganize, 
a cost that will ultimately be passed on to end-users. 
 
Separating a vertically integrated operator eliminates the coordination benefits, as well as 
the economies of scale and scope, that accrue from vertical integration. For example, 
coordinating  investments  in  the  network  between  the  new  (separated)  parties  may 
become  problematic,  given  that  innovations  in  services  may  require  investments  in 
competitive as well as non-competitive activities. 
 
Given that separation is a costly and time-consuming affair, it may raise the cost level of 
the incumbent operator. As a result, entrants become relatively – but not intrinsically – 
more competitive. Thus, structural separation on the one hand eliminates the possibilities 
to raise rivals'  costs, but on the other hand introduces new possibilities to do so.  
 
Finally,  the  decision  to  split  up  an  incumbent  forces  policy  makers  to  address  many 
complex questions. Some examples are the following: Exactly which form of separation is 
optimal? Should LoopCo, the local access monopolist, be a privately or a publicly owned 
company?  
 
It will be clear that making a cost-benefit analysis in a given situation, will neither be easy 
nor lead to a simple, unambiguous result. As noted in OECD (2003): 
                                                   
12 According to Crandall and Sidak (2002), this is a non-existent problem.   8
 
“The benefits  of structural  separation  are  uncertain  while  the costs  potentially 
large”. (OECD, 2003, p. 29.) 
 
An important question, however, is under which conditions one should go through such 
an analysis in the first place. 
 
 
2.2 The broader picture 
 
Should policy makers simply weigh the costs and benefits of structural separation, and 
based on the outcome, decide whether to go through with it, or is there more to it? Given 
the potential costs and uncertainties that were discussed in the previous subsection, one 
should at least think twice, and first explore the possibilities for improving the current 
regulatory regime. More importantly, however, is the fact that structural separation will 
not undo the bottleneck status – if any – of local access. Therefore, before initiating a 
cost-benefit  analysis,  one  shoudld  assess  exactly  under  which  conditions  structural 
separation makes sense in the first place. 
 
A central question that underlies privatization, liberalization, and more specific structural 
policy  interventions  such  as  separation,  is  whether  competition,  and  what  type  of 
competition, is possible at all in the market for fixed telephony. Do we just have to wait 
some more years before we can observe fullfledged competition between operators with 
their own networks? Or will some parts of the market always remain monopolies despite 
attempts  by  regulators  to  introduce  competition?  To  discuss  the  possibilities  for 
competition, one must therefore distinguish different modes of entry and competition.  
 
On  a  stylized  level,  one  can  distinguish  three  entry  modes  in  the  market  for  fixed 
telecommunications: 
 
·  Facilities-based entry: entrants roll out their own networks, including local access 
networks. 
·  LLU-based entry: entrants (who may roll out their own long-distance networks) 
lease local connections from the incumbent. 
·  Carrier Select-based entry: entrants (who may roll out their own long-distance 
networks)  purchase  originating  access  from  the  incumbent  to  allow  their 
customers to originate calls. 
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Whereas  facilities-based  entry  implies  complete  network  rollout,  ’pure’  cases  of  LLU-
based  entry  and  Carrier  Select-based  entry  would  involve  partial  or  no  infrastructure 
investment with regard to local access networks.
13 Hence, the latter two entry modes can 
be grouped together under the label ’access-based’ entry, although this common label 
does not do justice to the possibity that such entrants may actually invest a lot in their 
networks, for instance at the long-distance level, or rather selectively (targeting particular 
users) at the local level. One should therefore be aware that the distinction above does 
not explicitly recognize the wide variety in entry opportunities that can be observed in the 
real  world.  Observed  entry  strategies  include,  for  instance,  combinations  of  network 
rollout  in metropolitan  areas  aimed  at  business  customers  and  LLU-based  access  to 
residential end-users. 
 
In  a recent  speech,  the European  Commissioner  for  Competition  Policy,  Mario  Monti 
(2003),  warned  against  phrasing  the  discussion  in  terms  of  facilities-based  versus 
access-based competition: 
 
"The debate, it seems, is between those who advocate a facilities-based model of 
competition on one side, and those who advocate a model of competition based 
on access on the other side."  
(Written version of Monti, 2003, which may be different from delivered speech; 




"[...] I believe that there is not necessarily a contradiction between access-based 
and facilities-based competition. Competition would never be able to develop, in 
the  short  term,  if  entrants  were  not  able  to  gain  access  to  the  incumbent 
operator’s network to start offering services."  
(Monti, 2003; emphasis by PdB.) 
 
Monti  is,  of  course,  correct  in  pointing  out  there  is  not  always  a  black-and-white 
distinction. In fact, an optimal access regime typically takes into account that in an infant 
market, entrants  lack customer awareness and  a reputable track record for providing 
quality  high-quality  services  (De  Bijl  and  Peitz,  2002).  Nevertheless,  distinguishing 
different entry modes can be very useful, and is probably necessary, to structure the 
discussion in terms of fine-tuning regulation that takes into account entrants’ incentives to 
                                                   
13 LLU-based entry typically involves more investment than Carrier Select, because of the 
necessary technical adaptions at the level of local switches.   10
invest.
14  Indeed,  the  benefit  of  distinguishing  different  types  of  entry  seems  to  be 
confirmed in the following remark by Monti: 
 
"However,  it  must  also  be  that,  in  the  longer  term,  the  regulatory  framework 
should  privilege operators  which base  their competitive advantage on  building 
their own infrastructure, simply because they are those who are likely to  best 
improve the competitive conditions of the market."  
(Monti, 2003.) 
 
Accordingly,  to  design  a  regulatory  framework  that  over  time  increases  entrants’ 
incentives  for  network  rollout,  one  should  not  ignore  that  entrants may  lean stronger 
towards  access-based  operations  or  towards  a  strategy  aiming  at  building  their  own 
infrastructure.
15 In particular, which type of strategy an entrant follows will heavily depend 
on the regulatory regime in the first place. 
 
As  a  helpful  thought experiment,  let me  therefore  discuss  the  welfare  implications  of 
different entry modes, although the reader should keep in mind that this is an abstraction. 
First of all, facilities-based entry results, by definition, in ’infrastructure competition’ (or 
’network competition’), whereas access-based entry leads to ’services competition’.
16 The 
former type of competition implies that competitors have their own (local) infrastructure. 
The latter one implies that entrants offer services to end-users but do not have their own 
networks.  
 
Arguably, infrastructure competition is superior to services competition since it results in 
a  level  playing  field  between  incumbent  and  entrants,  allows  for  more  innovation  by 
entrants, and does not erode incumbents’ incentives to upgrade and maintain their own 
networks, as there is no ’free riding’. As a consequence, infrastructure competition leads 
to a higher welfare level, especially in the longer run: dynamic efficiency is increased. 
Network rollout takes time, though, so that the benefits for consumers do not materialize 
immediately. The emergence of successful operators may take, say, five to ten years, 
while the Schumpeterian process of ’creative destruction’ can lead to victims along the 
way. Thus, patience and determination from politicians, policy makers and regulators are 
required. Regulators, in addition, must actively make themselves redundant over time, for 
                                                   
14 See, for instance, De Bijl and Peitz (2002) and Valletti (2002), for analyses and discussions 
of access and retail regulation in different entry modes.. 
15 See Cave and Vogelsang (2002) for the regulatory notion of ‘eligibility’. 
16 See also Cave and Vogelsang (2002) for a discussion on infrastructure and services 
competition. De Bijl, van Damme and Larouche (2003) discuss the welfare implications of 
network and services competition in postal markets.   11
example by committing to ’sunset clauses’.  From a political economy viewpoint, this may 
not happen automatically. 
 
Services  competition,  on  the  other  hand,  results  relatively  quickly  in  intensified 
competition and hence lower prices for consumers. This is good for static efficiency in the 
short  run.  Drawbacks  are,  first,  that  little  effort    and  commitment  –  both  in  terms  of 
innovation  and  investment  –  are  required  from  entrants,  and  second,  that  entrants 
depend heavily on regulation. Resale or access-based business models may also limit 
the  scope  for  innovation  by  entrants,  since  the  incumbent's  existing  infrastructure  is 
restrictive  (in terms of  technological possibilities and  efficiency levels) compared  to  a 
network  that  is  designed  from  scratch.  Crandall  and  Sidak  (2002)  argue,  based  on 
empirical observations in the US, that entrants that build their own networks are more 
likely to generate revenues and survive than entrants that rely on access. 
 
"Several of the more successful CLECs [competitive local exchange carriers, i.e., 
entrants] combined resale and the leasing of unbundled network elements with 
the construction of their own networks, but none of these firms relies exclusively 
on UNEs [unbundled network elements] or resale and these firms added more 
facilities-based elements over time to improve upon the product that the ILECs 
[incumbent local exchange carriers] offer." 
(Crandall and Sidak, 2002, p. 398; additions between square brackets by PdB.) 
 
Services  competition  may  therefore  lead  to  lower  dynamic  efficiency,  compared  to 
network  competition.  Moreover,  withdrawing  an  open  access  regime  can  easily  force 
entrants that focus on reselling and marketing telephony services to leave the market. In 
other words, services competition not only requires that a heavy apparatus of fine-tuned, 
asymmetric  access  regulation  remains  in  place,  but  also  tends  to  lead  to  an 
unsustainable form of competition. 
 
The stylized comparison between network competition and services competition naturally 
raises the question whether market characteristics are such that network competition is 
feasible. In general, this is the case if the economies of scale and scope, and also the 
cost characteristics of network elements, make it possible that two or more firms, each 
one with its own facilities, can co-exist in a competitive market. Thus, the market may by 
definition be a natural monopoly, but only to a certain extent, since competition is viable. 
For  example,  postal  markets  are,  to  some  extent,  natural  monopolies,  but  without 
substantial  sunk  costs  that  result  in  bottlenecks.  Experience  in  several  countries 
demonstrates that facilities-based competition is a realistic option in postal markets (De   12
Bijl, van Damme and Larouche, 2003). This is quite different in the markets for electricity 
and gas, where economies of scale and sunk costs of the distribution network do not 
allow for more than one firm being active in distribution. Later I will come back to the 
question  whether  network  competition  is  feasible  in  the  market  for  fixed 
telecommunications. 
 
To conclude, the bottom line of the discussion above is that in general, infrastructure 
competition is superior to services competition. The question is whether it is feasible. The 
key to answer this question is an assesment of the bottleneck-nature of local access. An 
input to a production process, such as a certain part of a network, is a bottleneck – or 
equivalently, a monopolistic bottleneck, or an essential facility – if it is essential to provide 
services to end-users, and it cannot be economically reproduced, typically because of 
substantial sunk costs (see Knieps, 2002).
17  
 
It is crucial to distinguish bottlenecks from natural entry barriers, such as economies of 
scale and scope. Many, if not most, markets share natural-monopoly characteristics, but 
this does not imply that there are bottlenecks. An example is the postal market, in which 
sorting and distribution involves substantial economies of scale. Nevertheless, there are 




3. Persistent bottlenecks 
 
From the reasoning in the previous section, it follows that there is no need for structural 
separation if the market allows for network competition (i.e. competition resulting from 
facilities-based entry).  Formulated  in  another  way,  structural  separation makes  sense 
only  if  local  access  is  a  bottleneck.  Since  technological  change  may  eliminate  the 
bottleneck  nature  of  certain  network  elements,  one  should  add  the  condition  that 
bottlenecks will (i.e. are expected to) remain persistent. The latter condition is especially 
relevant  in  telecommunications,  a market  which  is  characterized  by  rapid  technogical 
change. 
 
The presence of a persistent bottleneck is not sufficient to make a case for structural 
separation, since a first check should be to assess why current regulatory regime is not 
effective.  Since  separation  is  a  costly  and  risky  intervention,  improvement  of  current 
regulation should always be the first step. A practical problem is that there may not be a 
                                                   
17 A bottleneck is by definition a monopolistic bottleneck. 
18 See Knieps (2002) and De Bijl, van Damme and Larouche (2003).   13
good benchmark. How can one assess whether the effectiveness of regulation can be 
improved? Hopefully, experience in other countries provides help, but still, for the best-in-
class country there is no comparison available. 
 
If local access is a persistent bottleneck and there are no ways to improve regulatory 
regime, then structural separation can be an option. Whether one should pursue in that 
direction should, of course, depend on a cost-benefit analysis. Figure 3.1 summarizes the 





























                                                   
19 See Cave (2003) for a somewhat different framework. The Ministry of Economic Affairs in 
the Netherlands (2000) also published a related decision framework, although with different 
implications. 
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Figure 3.1 illustrates that the key issue is the assesment of the bottleneck-nature of local 
access. Such an assessment may not be easy, unfortunately, as it depends on a range 
of different parameters. The most important one is perhaps the cost structure of local 
access. If the investment for network rollout are substantial and involve a large sunk cost, 
then it is more likely that there is a bottleneck. Cost characteristics do not exist in a 
vacuum,  though.  They  depend  to  a  large  extent  on  the  population  density  and 
geographical characteristics. For  instance, rolling  out a  local access network typically 
involves less costs (per end-user) in a metropolitan area, where consumers are located 
closely to one  another, than in  a rural area. Furthermore, the willingness to  pay  and 
nature of demand for telecommunications services determines the future revenues from 
the investment. Since business customers usually require more services and demand 
higher ’quantities’ than residential customers, investing in a network will not be equally 
attractive  for  different  segments  of  the  market.  Furthermore,  local  access  based  on 
existing technologies may happen to be a bottleneck now, but technological change may 
drastically  change  the  cost  characteristics  of  local  access  networks.  In  fact,  such 
technologies  already  exist,  think  for  instance  of  wireless  networks.  In  the  following 
section I will come back to this issue.  
 
Besides  cost,  demand  and  technological  characteristics,  also  the  institutional 
environment can have an important impact on the feasilibity of network competition. In 
particular, the goals, views and beliefs of policy makers and regulators, and how they 
translate into current and (expected) future access regimes, are crucial for the investment 
climate. For instance, Henisz and Zelner (2001) find, in an empirical study, that a low 
level of infrastructure deployment in a country may not mean that the market potential 
has remained untapped, but rather indicates a substantial risk of expropriation by the 
government. Within the context of this paper, the regulatory regime may prevent firms 
from investing in network rollout. Suppose, for example, that facilities-based entry is, in 
principle, profitable for entrants. If the regulator enforces a mandatory access regime 
combined with artificially low access prices, then entrants lose their incentives to roll out 
networks  themselves.  Thus,  if  the  regulator  believes  that  network  competition  is  not 
feasible, and for  that reason  imposes  network access at low  access prices,  then the 
belief of the regulator becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. In addition, a regulator may want 
to stimulate services competition independent of the existence of bottlenecks, in order to 
show that regulation is effective in the short run. More generally, whether a regulator 
wants to promote competition, secure low prices for consumers, or encourage the rapid 
deployment  of  infrastructure  will  indirectly  be  an  important  determinant  for  operators’ 
incentives to invest. 
   15
Crandall and Sidak (2002) argue that in the US, investments by entrants in residential 
areas  have  occurred  at  a  slower  rate  than  in  business  areas  because  of  regulatory 
distortions.  In  particular,  mandatory  unbundling  at  artificially  low  prices  encourage 
entrants to rely on incumbents’ facilities, and to ’wait and see’ before investing. These 
empirical  observations  confirm  that  mandatory  access  may  distort  firms’  investment 
decisions. 
 
Although it is outside the scope of this paper to present a complete framework for the 
identification  of  bottlenecks,  the  discussion  above  provides  several  guidelines  for 
analysis.  First,  unsegmented  structural  separation  can  never  be  fully  effective,  as  it 
ignores  fundamental  differences  that  may  exist  across  segments.  In  particular,  one 
should  distinguish  segments  according  to  population  density,  geographical 
characteristics, and different customers types (e.g. corporate and residential customers). 
It is likely that any assessment of bottlenecks will depend on the characteristics of the  
segments. The importance of geography suggests that structural separation may be an 
option in some areas but not in others, resulting in regional LoopCos. The extent to which 
regionally limited structural separation is technically feasible is another question. 
 
Second, since the bottleneck-nature is intertwined with policy and regulatory choices, one 
has  to  neutralize  feedback  effects  by  conceptualizing  a  hypothetical  regime  without 
mandatory access. This thought experiment, in which entry based on resale is ruled out 
by definition, provides a useful starting point for the analysis. It allows one to filter out 
policy-makers’ and regulators’ beliefs about the feasibility of network competition, as well 
as their goals (e.g. to stimulate services competition in the short run). 
 
Finally, the way in which the market is defined will have important implications for the 
assessment.  According  to  Crandall  and  Sidak  (2002),  one  should  not  restrict  the 
boundaries  of  the  market  to  the  deliverly  of  narrowband  applications  (such  as  voice 
telephony). The reason is that technological change and convergence expand the market 





Investing  in  telecommunications  assets  is  relatively  risky.  Think,  for  instance,  of  the 
unpredictability of demand (both in quantity and in nature), and about the high speed of 
technological change in ICT industries. Should policy makers try to reduce the risks faced 
by firms and investors? It will be obvious that it is socially optimal to reduce regulatory   16
uncertainty  to  the  minimum  by  creating  a  transparent  and  predictable  regulatory 
environment. Nevertheless, interfering with the intrinsic risks of new technologies is likely 
to distort firms’ incentives to invest and enter new markets. This can be detrimental to 
social welfare. 
 
Since network rollout takes considerable time and entrants initially lack a track record  for 
quality,  open  access  regimes  and  asymmetric  access  regulation  are  useful  in  infant 
industries.  However,  superimposing  a  market  structure  for  the  longer  run  may  be 
counterproductive. In particular, prolonged facilitation of resale-based entry may limit the 
options for entry and hence enforce existing monopolies. The potential damage of such 
intervention can be quite large in industries with fast technological change where the 
nature of future winning technologies is unknown. 
 
This paper underscores the key issue that underlies the case for structural separation, 
which  is  the  question  whether  there  is  a  persistent  bottleneck  with  respect  to  local 
access. Since the answer expectedly depends on cost and demand characteristics of  
different market segments,  a simple and single  answer may not exist. Moreover, the 
answer  is  interdependent  with  policy  and  regulatory  views,  beliefs  and  choices.  For 
segments with persistent bottlenecks, structural separation may be an option, so that a 
cost-benefit  analysis  will  be  a  natural  step  to  follow,  under  the  condition  that  the 
effectiveness of the current regulatory regime cannot be improved. 
 
The basic framework (figure 3.1) that summarizes the main decisions to be made with 
regard  to  structural  separation,  applies,  in  principle,  to  any  industry.  Other  network 
industries, such as electricity,  railways and  post immediately come  to mind. Post, for 
instance,  is  not  characterized  by  bottlenecks,  so  it  does  not  lend  itself  to  access 
regulation  or  structural  separation.  An  application  that  is  perhaps  less  obvious,  but 
nonetheless very relevant at present (see European Commission, 2002), is provided by 
the  market  for  national  and  international  clearing  and  settlement  of  securities 
transactions. In these markets, the ’book entry’ function of securities depositories has 
characteristics  of  a  natural  monopoly.  Even  though  book  entry  is  a  relatively 
straightforward  and  low-cost  operation,  it can  be  seen  as  a bottleneck.
20  Because of 
these characteristics, it may be socially optimal to separate this bottleneck element from 
the competitive parts involved in clearing and settlement, and create a central European 
securities  depository  that  performs  the  book  entry  function  at  a  regulated  price.  The 
international central securities depositories that currently provide this function as part of a 
                                                   
20 See Milne (2002).   17
bundle of clearing and settlement services, would then only be active in the markets for 
competitive services related to securities trade. 
 
To  conclude,  I  will  provide  a  personal  (and  therefore  subjective)  outlook  on  the 
telecommunications industry. It seems beyond controversy that local access will become 
more important for economic activity. Think, for instance, of the Internet, e-commerce, 
and  flexible  homeworking  to  combat  traffic  jams.  Thinking  ahead  five  to  ten  years,  I 
expect  that  local  access  will  not  remain  a  bottleneck,  at  least  not  in  most  market 
segments.  At  present,  there  already  exist  various  alternative  technologies  to  the 
traditional copper lines of incumbents. Examples include cable, the third generation of 
mobile telephony, WiFi (in particular if hotspots are connected to create a local network), 
and  wireless  local  loop.  In many  cases,  cable  and mobile  telephony  already  provide 
substitutes for end-users in the market for fixed telephony. More generally, while not all of 
the examples mentioned above have already been introduced or adopted, but there is no 
reason to expect that none of them will become a serious alternative. Also, if firms do not 
invest themselves, end-users may take initiative themselves, such as the development of 
a community-based network of connected WiFi hotspots. 
 
Accordingly, infrastructure competition – which is, from a welfare viewpoint, superior to 
services competition – seems feasible in telecommunications markets in the foreseeable 
future.  Therefore  mandatory  access  regimes  should  gradually  be  withdrawn,  so  that 
entrants'  incentives  to  invest  in  local  access  networks  are  restored.  Since  some 
segments of the market (e.g. residential customers in remote, rural areas) may always 
remain devoid of facilities-based competition, universal service obligations will probably 
remain necessary. 
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